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POINT
THE SUBTLE VICES OF THE
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN*

Quite unexpectedly, I shall begin this speech in a manner
that I did not anticipate when I signed on for this program. In
examining the materials that the Conference examiners reproduced from my book, Forbidden Grounds,' I discovered they gave
it an instructive new title. The heading renames the book Forbidden Grounds: The Case in Favor of Abolishing All Civil Rights
Laws.2 The original title was Forbidden Grounds: The Case
Against Employment DiscriminationLaws.3 The difference is important. In modern usage, the language "all civil rights laws"
covers a far broader terrain than "employment discrimination
laws." The term "civil rights laws" includes, for example, laws
devoted to voting rights,4 public accommodations 5 and housing.6
The principles applicable in private employment markets may not
carry over to these other areas, so we should not understand the
call for the repeal of Title VII 7 as an effort to return to the inexcusable rules that barred individuals from voting because of their
race or sex.8 Indeed, quite the opposite relationship seems proper.
So long as political and constitutional safeguards are in place, the
repeal of employment discrimination laws will not lead to a return
to the intolerable political position under Jim Crow that the modem civil rights laws did so much to discredit. Therefore, I will
direct my remarks to private conduct and not government power.
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. This Article is an adaptation of a speech given by Professor Epstein at the
conference entitled Handling the Difficult Civil Rights Case in the '90s held at The
John Marshall Law School on October 10, 1995.
1. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAws (1992) [hereinafter FORBIDDEN GROUNDS].

2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1988).
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1988).
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988).
7. This passage refers to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No.
88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964), amended by, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988 &
Supp. 1994).
8. Richard A. Epstein & Erwin Chemerinsky, Should Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 Be Repealed? 2 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 349, 349-50
(1993) [hereinafter Title VII Repeal].
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The organizers' misstatement of the book title should remind
us, moreover, of the modern transformation in our thinking about
the term "civil rights laws." The term's modem usage is somewhat
corrupted relative to its nineteenth century meaning. The debates
over the Civil Rights Act of 18669 took place hard on the heels of
the emancipation of the slaves and the end of the Civil War. Thus,
people used the phrase in opposition to political rights, of which
voting is perhaps the most important. This indicates that the
domain of civil rights was somewhat smaller than it is today. In
addition, the concept of civil rights within that more limited domain was closely linked to the question of civil capacity. The Civil
Rights Act of 1866 provides that all persons shall have the same
rights to buy, sell and lease property as white persons. 10 Congress designed this statute to extend the standard of civil capacity
of the most preferred class before its passage to all individuals regardless of race." The statute's clear implication was that since
any white person could decide with whom to contract or who not
as he or she saw fit, every other person would have exactly the
same right once the statute took effect. As originally understood,
the civil rights laws sought to insure that every individual had
the advantages of freedom of association and could hire and sell
his labor or sell or exchange his goods to whomever he so
pleased. "
Since the 1940s or 1950s, the definition of civil rights in
private sector disputes has veered sharply away from the original
definition to take, in fact, exactly the opposite position. Modern
civil rights laws circumscribe the grounds on which all employers
may refuse to do business with current or potential employees. 3
Modem civil rights laws no longer have the universal coverage of
the earlier civil rights acts directed toward civil capacity. Instead,
they focused originally on race, sex, religion and, later, on age and
disability.' 4 The question now is whether the shift in focus from
the older definition of civil rights to the newer one makes sense.
In dealing with the matter of "sense," the problem is not one
of cognition or definition. Instead the inquiry assumes that these
problems are resolved. It then asks which of the systems is most
efficient over the long haul; it asks which system will lead to a
greater level of productivity inside labor markets relative to its
competitors. The position that I took in Forbidden Grounds was,

9. Civil Rights Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988)).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1988).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
14. Id.
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and is, distinctly unfashionable. My view is that the entire apparatus of the Civil Rights Act of 1964"s should be scrapped insofar
as it applies to private employers in competitive markets. To this
general proposition, I shall state two important qualifications in
the hope of persuading you that the position I advocate is not as
implausible as some of you might think.
The first qualification is that my position is confined to private employers. In speaking about private behavior, the negative
pregnant in the proposition is that some non-discrimination obligations should be imposed on government, both when it acts as an
enforcer of various individual rights and also when it hires people
to fill its various offices. Governments depend on tax monies
raised from all individuals. Governments require all individuals to
surrender their rights of self-defense in order to obtain the benefit
of greater public protection. Governments must work for the benefit of all individuals, which means that they cannot be secular or
partisan in their operation. To allow governments to discriminate
in any direction without justification or cause indicates, to me, a
very serious violation of individual rights that should prompt
vigorous political and judicial responses. This norm of public nondiscrimination is of course what distinguishes my position from
the perpetuation or revival of Jim Crow. 16 Jim Crow laws relied
on extensive government regulations of social and economic arrangements which were based on explicit racial classifications. 7
This abhorrent system was the antithesis of laissez-faire, which
placed emphasis of strong property rights, freedom of contract and
limited government."8 By advocating the repeal of Title VII, I do
not urge a return to an age in which it is quite proper to heap
scorn and derision. Rather, my position is an effort to separate
private and public domains in order to protect the former from the
corrosive powers of the latter.
The need to limit government discretion should incline society toward the traditional color-blind rule that the first Justice
Harlan championed in his impassioned Plessy v. Ferguson9 dis-

15. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (1994).
16. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 91-115.
17. See Richard A. Epstein, The Status-Production Sideshow: Why the
Antidiscrimination Laws are Still a Mistake, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1085, 1104 (1995)
(recognizing that Jim Crow laws were pervasive programs that maintained African-Americans as a "subordinate racial caste"). See also Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to
Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REV. 303, 320-21
(1986) (noting that Jim Crow laws were designed to keep blacks in a lower social
position).
18. See Title VII Repeal, supra note 8, at 354 (discussing how taking direct
regulation of racial policies out of private industry would lead to a more free and
open economy).
19. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting),
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sent. Ironically, my allegiance to the antidiscrimination principle,
while not absolute in the public sphere, is much more firm than
modern civil rights advocates' views. For these advocates, the
public/private distinction matters relatively little and they favor
the two tier approach of a stringent antidiscrimination norm for
some forms of decisions and unimpeded voluntary affirmative
action programs for others. This role reversal is only one of many
that takes place in the general civil rights arena.
This qualification has to do with competition and market
structure. The basic argument I have made in favor of discrimination in employment markets is: when large numbers of employers who are in competition with one another, society does not have
to worry about the irrationality or stupidity of any individual
employee or employer.2 ° Instead, society must ask itself how the
least irrational employer would respond to the requests of workers
in disfavored groups. The reason is clear enough. A majority vote
is not required to get a job in an open market. People normally do
not expect to find employment with employers who are hostile to
their aims and ambitions. Yet, as long as there is any variation in
taste, the inclinations of the hostile group do not matter because
these groups can pair themselves up with employers who have
favorable sentiments. Thus, if ninety percent of the market is
absolutely irrational and crazy, people who have the qualities of
mind, the temperament and the work ability which allows them to
succeed in the workplace can seek employment with the remaining ten percent. The long term consequences are even more favorable. If the ten percent of the employers willing to put prejudice
aside get better workers for a lower price than the rival irrational
firms, they will be able to expand their market share and, thus,
create more opportunities for the disadvantaged workers who are
left behind. The process of equilibration in markets strongly favors disadvantaged workers.
In order to understand the dangers of collective action, it is
very instructive to compare the operation of a market with the
operation of a jury. In an earlier speech today, Mr. Galland said
that jurors often exhibit irrational behavior or questionable judgment in race and sex cases. Unfortunately, I think that some
evidence supports this view and does not suggest that the bad
motives infect only individuals of one race. The dangers come from

overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In his dissent in Plessy,
Justice Harlan argued that the Constitution is "color blind" and that "[i]n respect
of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law." Id. at 559.
20. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 29-41.
21. George F. Galland, Jr., Presentation given at The John Marshall Law
School seminar on Handling the Difficult Civil Rights Case in the '90s (Oct. 10,
1995).
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all quarters. Moreover, the dangers are far more important in a
jury that holds the power of life and death over a single individual
than they are in markets. Why the difference? When there are
twelve jurors, society cannot say that the decision will be made by
one or two jurors who can sift through the evidence and make
dispassionate judgments on a defendant's guilt or innocence.
Rather, all jurors must reach a collective verdict, making it very
unlikely that the one or two most rational jurors will dictate the
outcome. Given this collective dynamic, we cannot be that optimistic about the final outcome. The collective decision will very likely
track the sentiments of the median voter on the jury. Unlike a
market, isolated groups, such as juries, make decisions that matter by the individuals who are most supportive of them. Individuals behave one way in making collective decisions and quite another way in making decentralized decisions. The critical advantage of the competitive market is that it allows more rational
players to act on their own initiative without having to persuade
their more capricious peers to join forces with them. Rational
jurors cannot drive out irrational ones. Rational market participants can drive out irrational ones.
The second qualification asks whether we should always
regard the word "discrimination" as a term of opprobrium. The
classical meaning of discrimination had the opposite connotation.
People used the word to compliment individuals for their ability to
distinguish between good and bad. When you said that somebody
had "discriminating taste," it meant that they could tell the difference between a fine wine and its inferior impostor. Now that the
civil rights movement has taken over the term, saying that somebody is a "discriminator" carries with it the implication of invidious behavior. But is that correct? In chapter three of Forbidden
Grounds, "Rational Behavior in Competitive Markets,"2 2 I argued
that in certain contexts, the former meaning of discrimination,
mainly that which facilitates sensible and rational judgments,
provides the appropriate lens through which to view the overall
social situation.23 The book identifies a couple of these situations
in order to explain why a well-functioning competitive industry
will not have each firm as reduced microcosms of the larger universe. If 100 firms in the computer industry have certain distributions by race and sex, you would not expect each firm to have a
distribution that matches that of the industry as a whole.
The explanation for the differences in firm composition basically comes in two parts. The first part is that firms supply their
workers with more than a menu of individual benefits in the form

22. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 59-61.
23. Id. at 59-78.
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of wages, job assignments, promotion opportunities and vacations.
Firms also supply these workers with a localized public good,
namely a work place environment that is shared with other workers. This common environment is a public good limited to members of the firm. The greater the disparity in taste among the
workers, the more difficult it will be for employers to provide a
single homogenous environment equally pleasing to all. One way
employers may avoid this problem is to eliminate some of the
divergence by grouping workers according to common tastes,
which implies some degree of discrimination among them. As long
as workers' tastes are correlated by race, religion, sex and age
(and one can easily add disability), some forms of discrimination
routinely condemned under the Civil Rights Act actually work to
the advantage of employees in both groups. It is quite likely that
tastes in music, in food and in decor do correlate along these lines;
that is the testimony that people hear more frequently from women, blacks and religious minorities than from white males. Society
has no reason to treat these tastes as suspect or not worthy of
respect. The government is not, and should not, be in the mindbending business because it does not possess the superior wisdom
to allow it to shape the preferences of its citizens.
Once again I must stress the consequences. If this argument
is correct, then on some portion of the spectrum, higher levels of
discrimination should be accompanied by higher wage levels given
the higher productivity that the reconfigured workers can generate. In some settings, net wages for black and white, male and
female workers could all rise when segregation increases. However, these are merely tendencies and not absolutes. Firms can easily reverse their field without having to go before some public
board to confess error and to obtain absolution. We can also predict which firms will likely prize a strong interracial atmosphere.
A real estate firm that is trying to sell to a broad clientele will
want to have staff that can relate to the full range of its customer
base. Therefore, these firms will prize individuals who can get
along with other persons. They will also use trade to encourage
the removal of prejudices not only as a moral, but also as a business matter. However, we do not have to put absolute faith in its
ability to assess the dynamics of each individual firm. At some
level, it is best for society to learn that it does not have to care.
Let the chips fall where they may, firm by firm. Different firms
have different internal dynamics and they can sort through these
problems without an assist from the national government.
The second reason why some form of discrimination might be
rational in markets stems from the commonplace observation that
all legal contracts are not perfectly enforceable in fact. 24 Every24. For a more detailed discussion of rational discrimination arising out of em-
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one understands that there is a lot of slippage between cup and
lip, and that sometimes people do not have a legal remedy even
when there are clear violations of contractual terms. 25 The absence of a legal remedy does not necessarily mean that there is no
remedy at all. Rather, people will shift the search toward substitute informal mechanisms that take the place of legal remedies in
order to keep people in line. Generally speaking, the greater the
level of sympathy and cooperation between individuals, the greater the number of non-job-related ties that individuals have to one
another, the more likely that these people will honor their business arrangements. These informal sanctions become extremely
important when trying to define how employees and partners will
start to interact with one another. Close knit communities, such
as the Israelis in the diamond trade and the Koreans in the grocery business, rely on these informal arrangements to facilitate
complex credit arrangements that could not survive in the long
run if only legal remedies stood between a creditor and default.
Thus, it follows that the discrimination and specialization that
occurs in markets is not a sure sign of irrationality. 6 Many
forms of discrimination have no systematic harmful component.
The use of discrimination is compatible with overall increases in
wealth and human satisfaction.
The case against antidiscrimination laws in private competitive markets is, in fact, still stronger than this. One common feature of antidiscrimination laws that is often overlooked is how
they frequently work at cross purposes to one another. Although
proponents advertise these laws as a coherent whole, they often
do not work in that fashion. The way I like to put this point to
student groups is by asking them the following question: which
would be of greater benefit to them in the work place, the repeal
of age discrimination statutes 27 or the more vigorous enforcement of race and sex discrimination laws? Without hesitation, I
will answer it is the former. Nothing impedes the progress of
young people up an organizational ladder more than the prohibition of mandatory retirement practices and the heavy loading of
damages for willful discrimination under the age statute. These
statutes do not solely affect the relationships between employees
and elder workers, but also have manifest, negative spillover
effects on third parties.
Thus, if society looks at the overall distribution of income in

ployment contracts, see
25. Id. at 69.

FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note

1, at 59-78.

26. Id. at 70. Thus, it is cheaper to do business within a closely knit group than

it is to do business with strangers. Id.
27. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 &
Supp. 1994).

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 29:575

the United States, the most striking feature about this statistic is
how the major powerful and political clout of the over fifty-five set
has led to a skew in wealth and opportunities in the United
States. The average income and wealth of people over fifty-five
relative to that of people thirty-five has increased vastly in past
years.2" Age discrimination laws contribute to this increase,
along with the escalation of social security benefits relative to
wages and the vast expansion of Social Security, Medicare and
Medicaid. 29 No evidence exists which supports reverse flows to
the twenty to thirty-five set. Clearly, the wealth transfers only to
the older set. How should society respond?
One possibility is for the younger set to try to get even. Rather than commit political suicide by seeking to repeal the age discrimination statute, the younger set could try to strengthen the
protections for other individuals. For example, government could
increase the penalties for race and sex discrimination in order to
more evenly enforce them across the board.
This is a losing strategy. The workplace already suffers from
too much uncertainty, confusion and overregulation. If the government strengthens antidiscrimination laws on race and sex, it
increases its administrative costs, it further hampers the degree
of flexibility that employers retain and it reduces the mobility of
labor by making it harder for people to get jobs and, therefore,
more reluctant to quit present jobs. The search for
counterstrategies leaves everyone worse off. When there is a hole
in the bottom of the boat, it is best to patch it, not to cut a second
one.
Let me try to make the point in a more forceful fashion. Can
society best evaluate the effectiveness of the civil rights laws by
analyzing whether their use advances or retards the welfare of
various individuals or groups? Litigators have a strong time preference in how they ask that question. They typically begin the
analysis the moment when a potential client has been laid off by a

28. See generally Thomas Sowell, The Social Security Scam: The Poor Pay the
Wealthy, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 25, 1995, at B5. This article noted that individuals
55 to 64 years old average more than four times the net wealth as those individuals under the age of 35. Id.
29. For a discussion of Social Security, see Michael Miller, Uh-Oh, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, Apr. 15, 1996, at 20. The author notes, for example, that "in the 1970s,
[social security] benefits grew 'ten times faster in real terms than did the number of
Americans aged 65 and older.'"Id. (emphasis in original). For a more technical presentation on the same issue, see Martin Feldstein, The Missing Piece in Policy
Analysis: Social Security Reform (The Richard T. Ely Lecture to the American
Economic Association (1995)). Mr. Feldstein observed that "[tihe resulting deadweight loss is approximately one percent of each year's GDP [Gross Domestic Product] in perpetuity, an amount equal to 20 percent of payroll tax revenue and a 50
percent increase in deadweight loss of the personal income tax." Id.
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harsh, indifferent employer. The only question is whether you, as
a lawyer, can get the client compensation for the harm that he or
she has suffered. At this juncture, you are not interested in the
creation of opportunities for other individuals. You are interested
in exacting a pound of flesh for your client. The way you can
achieve this result is to pursue the other fellow to make sure that
transfer payment in damages takes place.
However, that legal daring is shortsighted from a social point
of view. Complainants must always remember that the moment
they bring suit in one case, it is going to influence behavior of
potential employers in other settings long before any suit is or can
be filed in those other settings. Any sound overall assessment
cannot ignore the material effects that such litigation has on the
creation of new jobs for other workers. Tracing down these consequences will be hard. Firms are not likely to announce that their
decisions are made to minimize the adverse effects of the civil
rights laws. They are not likely to broadcast their strategy. The
effects are likely to be large and significant, but they also will be
hidden from view. They may involve decisions on where to build
the next new plant; or to decide which of two plants the firm will
expand and by how much; or to decide which plant the firm will
shut down. Civil rights laws also might influence the types of
capital equipment that companies purchase, or the kinds of new
jobs they create. They surely influence the percentage of individuals who companies will hire as employees covered under the Civil
Rights Act, compared to the percentage of work that will be set
out on a piecework basis to independent contractors to whom the
Civil Rights Act 0 does not apply. It is no accident that the rate
of independent contracting, e.g., the number of temporary workers
in the United States, is increasing rapidly."1 A key motivation
for this trend is to enable employers to escape the burdens associated with civil rights laws and other so-called protective employment laws.
The moral is clear. Government must never ask whether a
civil rights law is a good thing after a violation has occurred, but
must ask people to decide whether they desire the law before they
know whether they will lose or gain a job because of its operation.
Here, the default position of no civil rights law leads to a more
open and competitive economy, which increases people's chances

30. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
31. See James Risen, Temporary Employment Industry Working Overtime Jobs:
Rapid Growth Attributed to Corporate Cost-Cutting, L.A. TIMES, July 5, 1994, at
Al. This article noted that 15% of all jobs created during the recent economic recovery are temporary. Id. The reason for this increase is "directly attributable" to
the fact that American corporations are cutting the costs associated with permanent workers. Id.
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of being hired for a job with good raises. People will gain more
from the high side of markets than they will lose from their low
side precisely because, as mentioned earlier, they can migrate to
the employers who favor them the most. We must beware of judging a system only by its failures and then judging the system's
rivals only by the successful suits it fosters. The simple and ultimate point is that no system of government regulations can outperform a competitive economy. No rigged economic scheme with
government at its center will do better. Yet when all the shouting
dies down, the chief achievement of the civil rights laws is just
that; they create a government monopoly that subsidizes, in disguise, some employees at the expense of employees, employers and
customers. It is nice to assume that you can somehow create a
better society even when you have less wealth to go around on the
happy illusion that you can surgically distribute it to the right
people. The reality is, however, that the wealth will rarely end up
in the hands of its intended recipients. Too many people, from
lawyers to bureaucrats to politicians, will take their cut of the
action first.
This type of proposal will likely not go down well to the civil
rights bar, either plaintiffs or defendants. The proposal to repeal
the statute as it applies to private competitive firms puts a big
crimp in the cases that plaintiffs bring and, by necessity, in those
that defendants can defend. 2 So, the system has the intellectual
virtue and political defect of hurting all segments of the bar in
equal measure. Yet in making this proposal, should I be regarded
as some form of reactionary? Well, I think most of you will join
the chorus of yeses. Perhaps I can redeem myself a small bit to
portray myself as someone who has advanced at least to the Dark
Ages from prehistoric times by commenting briefly on the question: what does my position entail about affirmative action?
The usual suspicions are clear. Many people take the view
that anyone who is against the Civil Rights Act of 1964 simply
has to be a die-hard opponent of affirmative action - political
affirmative action is more venturesome than the color-blind standard of the 1964 Act, so anyone who dislikes the Act cannot support or tolerate affirmative action. This is wrong, at least in part.
A word of explanation is given because the defense of affirmative

32. In 1994, complainants filed 95,447 employment discrimination claims with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). David C. Bert, Note,
Election of Remedies in Employment Discrimination Law: Doorway into the Legal
Hall of Mirrors, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 145, 153 n.37 (1995) (citing Janet Novak,
Silver Lining, FORBES, Nov. 21, 1994, at 124). Furthermore, the number of employment discrimination cases filed in federal court increased 109% from 1990 to 1994.
Id. at 146 n.5 (citing Peter Eisler, Overloaded System Tests New Strategies, USA
TODAY, Aug. 15, 1995, at 10A).
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action that I want to give does not, to say the least, follow the
conventional lines. Instead, my point follows not from my view of
racial politics, but from my view of the proper set of legal rights
in employment markets. My root position is that employers may
hire or not hire employees on any ground they see fit.33 Based on
that view, none needs state approval, and none should face state
resistance, if they decide on their own to start affirmative action
programs. To use a quaint phrase, it is an employer's own business whether it starts a program of that sort. Most certainly, employers do not have to come to me in order to explain their affirmative action programs or receive my blessing. If employers want
to institute such programs, the only people they have to satisfy
are their shareholders and their employees. If they want to go
along with the proposal, then society does not have to worry about
the federal government; does not have to worry about the state
government; does not have to worry about anybody.
Will any affirmative action programs survive if the government repeals the Civil Rights Act tomorrow? My guess is yes. The
explanation is prosaic. For many reasons some firms will think
that it is a good marketing strategy. Others will think that a
program of this sort responds to their intrinsic sense of fairness.
Others will think that it is the least they can do to rectify past
harms, including those for which they believe they bear no personal responsibility. My only take on the question is that we do not
need to agree among ourselves on whether it should be done, how
it should be done, when it should be done or who should benefit
from it, whether by race, ethnicity, sex or age. This vexing issue
would sort itself out much easier in a decentralized fashion. We do
not need one monopoly like government decision on which affirmative action either stands or falls.
The overall situation should now be clear. Most people think
of civil rights litigation in terms of the glorious results it can
achieve in individual cases. I tend to think about it, quite differently, as a system with two dominant characteristics. One, it
imposes a single term on all firms so that a competitive market is
a government monopoly in any or all firms with fifteen or more
workers. Two, this government monopolist never goes about the
business of maximizing output. Rather, it constantly finds ways to
create cross-subsidies between various groups which share one
common characteristic. The winners get less than the losers pay.
This is not good business. Society wants to foster win-win relationships. That is what employment contracts did before Congress
enacted the civil rights acts. However, now the civil rights act
makes a fraction of those contracts win-lose, where the losers lose

33. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 413-19.
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more than the winners win. Such a system is unstable. To avoid
this problem, society should return to the basic ideals of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, 34 to which the Civil Rights Act of 196435 is
antithetical.3 6

34. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6.
35. Civil Rights Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 1982).
36. See Title VII Repeal, supra note 8, at 349-50 (focusing on a similar debate
where Professor Epstein called for the repeal of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964).

